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QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 
U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection component of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
ii 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici, scholars and professors primarily of 
family law and the law of equal protection, submit 
this brief to respond directly to arguments advanced 
by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) that 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is justified 
because it advances child welfare. Specifically, BLAG 
asserts that DOMA advances child welfare by: (1) 
providing a stable structure to raise unintended and 
unplanned offspring; (2) encouraging the rearing of 
children by their biological parents; and (3) promot-
ing childrearing by both a mother and a father.2 Each 
of these purported justifications expresses and en-
forces a bare preference for the children of opposite-
sex couples as the only children entitled to the type of 
permanency, stability and so-called “ideal” parenting 
arrangements that DOMA allegedly confers. These 
articulated justifications reveal that DOMA’s real 
function is to draw invidious distinctions between 
families headed by opposite-sex parents and families 
 
 1 This brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by 
counsel for either party, and no person other than amici and 
their academic institutions contributed monetarily to the 
preparation or submission of this brief. This amicus brief is filed 
pursuant to the blanket consent executed by the parties and 
with the consent of Windsor. 
 2 Brief on the Merits for Respondent The Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 44-49, 
United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2013) 
(hereinafter Brief for Respondent). 
2 
headed by same-sex parents, and, by implication, 
between the children in these families. 
 Amici’s scholarship refutes the validity of BLAG’s 
child welfare justifications by delineating the legal, 
economic and psychological injuries that DOMA 
inflicts on children with same-sex parents. Amici’s 
scholarship further demonstrates that DOMA is 
categorically impermissible under this Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence because it punishes children 
for the conduct of their parents. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 BLAG acknowledges that the Equal Protection 
Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons 
similarly situated should be treated alike,”3 and yet 
DOMA patently violates this most fundamental 
understanding of the equal protection guarantee. The 
children of same-sex married couples are identically 
situated to the children of opposite-sex married 
couples, in terms of their need for and entitlement to 
the types of family-supporting governmental rights 
and benefits regulated by DOMA. Yet DOMA imposes 
permanent class distinctions between these two 
groups of children by penalizing the children of same-
sex couples merely because their parents are of the 
same sex.  
 
 3 Brief for Respondent at 46-47 (citing City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).  
3 
 Further, this Court has made clear that the 
government may not punish children (by, for example, 
denying them government-conferred benefits4) based 
on moral disapproval of the parents’ relationship, or 
in an effort to regulate the parents’ conduct.5 DOMA 
punishes children for conduct over which they have 
no control, which bespeaks invidious discrimination 
rather than an effort to attain legitimate govern-
mental objectives.6 
 
 4 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding state 
law that denied recovery to illegitimate child for the wrongful 
death of the child’s mother violated equal protection).  
 5 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1982) (quoting Trimble 
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)) (holding that arguments in 
support of withholding state benefits to illegal entrants do not 
apply to children of illegal entrants because they cannot affect 
their parents’ conduct or their own status). 
 6 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding 
that private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are 
not permissible considerations for removal of an infant child 
from the custody of his mother); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety, 
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (striking down state law denying 
workers’ compensation proceeds to non-marital children, ex-
plaining “[t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through the 
ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the 
bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head 
of an infant is illegal and unjust.”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20 
(striking down Texas law that withheld state education funds 
from school districts that enrolled children of Mexican descent 
not legally admitted to the United States, in part, because 
“children can neither affect their parents’ conduct nor their own 
status.”); Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (“We conclude that it is invidious 
to discriminate against [non-marital children] when no action, 
conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm 
that was done the mother.”). 
4 
 Amici advance two main points. First, DOMA 
affirmatively harms children. Although advocates and 
commentators have thoroughly documented the ways 
in which DOMA disadvantages same-sex couples, less 
attention has been paid to the class of children ad-
versely affected by DOMA’s discriminatory frame-
work.7 As demonstrated below, a significant number 
of children in the United States are being raised by 
same-sex couples, as well as by single gay and lesbian 
parents. DOMA inflicts immediate, concrete injuries 
on a subset of these children, namely: those whose 
families would otherwise benefit from federal family-
supporting programs, but whose parents’ marriages, 
while recognized on the state level, are rejected at the 
federal level. Throughout this brief, this subset of 
children will be referenced as “the excluded class of 
 
 7 For discussions of same-sex marriage from the perspective 
of children, see Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: 
Justifying Same-Sex Marriage from the Perspective of the Child, 
102 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 412 (1999) (“[t]he preponderance of the 
dialogue about same-sex marriage concentrates on the adult 
partners and their derivative benefits from the relationship; 
precious little focus is given to the rights of a child who may be a 
product of a same-sex relationship”); Nancy D. Polikoff, For the 
Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex 
Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573, 586 
(2005); Courtney G. Joslin, Searching for Harm: Same-Sex 
Marriage and the Well-Being of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. 
REV. 81, 85-89 (2011); Ruth Butterfield Isaacson, “Teachable 
Moments”: The Use of Child-Centered Arguments in the Same-
Sex Marriage Debate, 98 CAL. L. REV. 121, 131-51 (2010); 
Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex 
Parents, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2037519. 
5 
children.”8 In addition to exacting an impermissible 
legal and economic toll on the excluded class of chil-
dren, DOMA also stigmatizes and psychologically 
harms all children of same-sex couples by declaring 
their families inferior to those headed by opposite-sex 
couples.9 Far from promoting the welfare of children, 
DOMA does nothing to help the children of opposite-
sex couples, while actively harming the children of 
same-sex couples. Thus, this purported state interest 
cannot provide even a rational basis for the law, as it 
finds no “footing in the realities of the subject ad-
dressed by the legislation.”10 
 Second, DOMA fails in its entirety because it 
serves an impermissible function: it punishes the 
excluded class of children based on nothing more 
than moral disapproval of their parents’ conduct.11 
This Court has repeatedly struck down classifications 
that are based in the majority’s bare moral disap-
proval of a disfavored social group as a violation of 
 
 8 Specifically, this class of children includes children of 
same-sex couples who are lawfully married in one of the nine 
marriage-equality states or the District of Columbia.  
 9 Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) 
(“The impact [of racial segregation on children] is greater when 
it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the races 
is usually seen as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”) 
(quoting the lower court). 
 10 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993). 
 11 Weber, 406 U.S. at 171; Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433. 
6 
the Equal Protection Clause.12 Further, laws are 
simply not permitted to permanently place a disfa-
vored group of children into a disadvantaged class.13 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. DOMA AFFIRMATIVELY HARMS CHIL-
DREN 
 The children of same-sex couples are an im-
portant and increasingly sizable segment of our 
society, in particular in those states that permit 
same-sex couples to marry, where one-third of same-
sex married couples are raising children.14 
 
 12 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“the 
fact that a governing majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”) (quoting 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)); U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 
(1973). See also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Ani-
mus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 921-24 (2012) (discussing Law-
rence and moral disapproval). 
 13 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 208 (striking law that “permanent-
ly locked” a disfavored group of children “into the lowest socio-
economic class.”). 
 14 Sara Wildman, Children Speak for Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2010), http:// www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/ 
fashion/21kids.html; Williams Institute, United States Census 
Snapshot: 2010, at 3, available at http://williamsinstitute.law. 
ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Census2010Snapsho-US-v2.pdf.  
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 BLAG asserts that DOMA advances child welfare 
by: (1) providing a stable structure to raise unintend-
ed and unplanned offspring; (2) encouraging the 
rearing of children by their biological parents; and (3) 
promoting childrearing by both a mother and a fa-
ther.15 In fact, the real effect of DOMA is to place the 
excluded class of children in a legal, economic and 
social underclass16 and to stigmatize all children with 
gay or lesbian parents. 
 
A. The Children of Gay and Lesbian Par-
ents Are an Important and Sizable 
Segment of Society 
 An October 2011 study, “All Children Matter,” 
estimated that “roughly two million children are 
being raised by LGBT parents.”17 According to the 
United States Census, twenty-eight percent of cohab-
itating same-sex couples are raising at least one child 
under the age of eighteen.18 Of these, it is estimated 
 
 15 Brief for Respondent at 44-49. 
 16 See Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
338 (D. Conn. 2012) (noting DOMA’s effect of “limiting the 
resources, protections, and benefits available to children of 
same-sex parents.”). 
 17 See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., ALL CHIL-
DREN MATTER: HOW LEGAL AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES HURT LGBT 
FAMILIES (“ALL CHILDREN MATTER”), 1 (2011), available at: 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/10/pdf/all_children_ 
matter.pdf. 
 18 GARY J. GATES AND JASON OST, THE GAY AND LESBIAN 
ATLAS 45 (2004). 
8 
that between 300,000 to one million children are 
being raised by same-sex couples; the remainder are 
children being raised by single gays and lesbians.19 
“Contrary to stereotypes, children being raised by 
same-sex couples are twice as likely to live in poverty 
as children being raised by married heterosexual 
households.”20 Further, same-sex couples of color are 
raising children at a much higher rate than white 
same-sex couples.21  
 As for the children of families excluded by Sec-
tion 3 of DOMA, while there is no consensus as to 
exact numbers, it is estimated that one-third of same-
sex couples in marriage states are raising children.22 
These numbers are likely to increase as more states 
extend the institution of marriage to include their gay 
and lesbian residents. 
 As discussed below, DOMA categorically excludes 
these children from enjoying the family-supporting 
rights, benefits and protections provided by the 
 
 19 Todd Brower, It’s Not Just Shopping, Urban Lofts and the 
Lesbian Gay-by Boom: How Sexual Orientation Demographics 
Can Inform Family Courts, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
1, 27 (2009). 
 20 ALL CHILDREN MATTER at 1. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Sara Wildman, Children Speak for Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/ 
fashion/21kids.html; Williams Institute, United States Census 
Snapshot: 2010, at 3, available at http://williamsinstitute.law. 
ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Census2010Snapsho-US-v2.pdf.  
9 
federal government to other families. Given the 
substantial and adverse impact of DOMA on the 
children of same-sex couples, BLAG’s contention that 
excluding these families promotes the interests of 
children is patently irrational. 
 
B. DOMA Deprives Children of Important 
Federal Benefits 
 BLAG concedes – as it must – that inclusion in 
the safety net of federal family-supporting rights and 
benefits is important to the stability of children.23 
Indeed, it largely defends DOMA on the basis of the 
benefits it creates for children – although BLAG fails 
to explain how excluding some families and not 
others advances this goal.24 
 BLAG’s argument is premised on the notion that 
only some children are entitled to these benefits – 
children of opposite-sex couples. Yet children in the 
excluded class are deserving of these protections as 
well. These children face the entire range of experi-
ences that define family life, including family medical 
crises, divorce, parental lay-offs, and parental death.25 
 
 23 Brief for Respondent at 3-4. 
 24 Id. at 44-49 (listing as the reasons for supporting DOMA 
that it supports providing a stable structure in which to raise 
children).  
 25 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 171 (“Both the statute in Levy and 
the statute in the present case involved state created compensa-
tion schemes, designed to provide close relatives and dependents 
(Continued on following page) 
10 
Tragically, when these events take place, DOMA 
denies these children access to resources designed to 
serve as safety nets to protect children within family 
units – benefits that children with opposite-sex 
married parents obtain as a matter of course.26 
 The exclusion of same-sex married couples from 
over 1,100 federal marital rights and benefits has a 
direct and harmful economic impact on their children. 
For example, their families are denied the protections 
of the Family Medical Leave Act, which was enacted 
to help “balance the demands of the workplace with 
the needs of families, to promote the stability and 
economic security of families.”27 The FMLA permits 
eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of 
unpaid leave to care for a child, spouse, or parent 
with a serious health condition.28 It is beyond argu-
ment that the children of married same-sex couples 
have the same interest in family security and stabil-
ity as the children of married opposite-sex couples. 
Excluding same-sex married couples from the FMLA 
subjects the child and the entire household to 
 
of a deceased a means of recovery for his often abrupt and 
accidental death”). 
 26 For a list of privileges that benefit heterosexual couples 
and opposite-sex parents, see Angela Onwuachi-Willig, ACCORD-
ING TO OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER AND THE LAW 
OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 159-61 (Yale University Press 2013). 
 27 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) & (2). 
 28 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
11 
“greater stress in attempting to cope with the serious 
illness of a parent.”29  
 The excluded children also are prevented from 
obtaining federal health insurance under the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHB), which 
offers coverage to federal civilian employees and their 
family members. DOMA prohibits same-sex married 
spouses from obtaining coverage, once again, exacting 
an economic toll on the same-sex married household, 
diverting economic resources from child-rearing, and 
creating a burden that opposite-sex married couples 
and their children do not carry.30 
 In addition, DOMA precludes same-sex married 
couples from filing joint tax returns. These couples 
pay more in taxes than their opposite-sex counter-
parts, “depleting the resources available to provide 
for their children.”31 
 Finally, DOMA denies same-sex married couples 
Social Security payments if a spouse dies or becomes 
 
 29 Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 339. 
 30 Id. at 299-300 (Plaintiffs Damon Savoy and John Weiss, 
married under Connecticut law, were denied FEHB, diverting 
funds from their three adopted children to cover health insur-
ance for Weiss, their full-time stay-at-home dad). 
 31 Id. at 339. Plaintiffs Suzanne Artis and Geraldine Artis, 
raising three children together, were denied the marital benefit 
of filing their taxes jointly. Id. at 304. 
12 
disabled, reducing and/or diverting funds that would 
be used to raise and support the couples’ children.32 
 These are merely a few examples of countless 
scenarios revealing DOMA’s adverse effect on the 
children of same-sex married couples. As the district 
court in Pedersen v. OPM found: 
DOMA is inimical to its stated purpose of 
protecting children . . . DOMA does not alter 
or restrict the ability of same-sex couples to 
adopt children, a right conferred by state 
law, and therefore, DOMA’s denial of federal 
marital benefits to same-sex married couples 
in fact leads to significant unintended and 
untoward consequences by limiting the re-
sources, protections and benefits available to 
children of same-sex parents.33 
Denial of these protections is not a one-time injury; 
rather, this denial over the course of a child’s life-
time is cumulative and disrupts one of the primary 
 
 32 See Id. at 303 (surviving spouse of same-sex couple 
denied Social Security lump-sum death benefit); Brief for 
Respondent at 9 (quoting Senator Gramm as stating that 
without DOMA, state recognition of same-sex marriage will 
create new survivor benefits under Social Security). 
 33 Id. at 338. Amici do not necessarily agree that DOMA’s 
consequences for children of same-sex parents were “unintend-
ed,” but, regardless of the original intent behind DOMA, BLAG’s 
justifications for the law explicitly state a preference for the 
welfare of children of opposite-sex parents over the welfare of 
children of same-sex parents. 
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functions of family units – to provide stability (finan-
cial and otherwise) for future generations. 
 
C. DOMA Inflicts Psychological Harm on 
All Children with Gay or Lesbian Par-
ents 
 In addition to the direct legal and economic harm 
DOMA inflicts on children with same-sex married 
parents, DOMA also inflicts psychological harm by 
symbolically expressing the inferiority of families 
headed by same-sex parents and the children in those 
families. 
 BLAG’s characterization of DOMA as a child-
protective measure that promotes “responsible pro-
creation and child-rearing” is at odds with the ad-
verse impact of the legislation on all children with 
gay or lesbian parents. The effect and purpose of 
DOMA is to stigmatize the families of which these 
children are a part, and, by extension, to stigmatize 
these children.34 As Dr. Gregory Herek (Professor of 
Psychology at U.C. Davis, who is known for his 
extensive empirical work investigating the impact of 
structural prejudice in the context of sexual orienta-
tion) has observed: 
 
 34 Aff. of Gregory M. Herek, Ph.D. at ¶ 29, Mass. v. U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Services, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(No. 1:09-cv-11126-JLT), 2010 WL 604593 (“Stigma refers to an 
enduring condition, status, or attribute that is negatively valued 
by society . . . and that consequently disadvantages and disem-
powers those who have it.”). 
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Denying federal recognition to married 
same-sex couples devalues and delegitimizes 
their relationships. It conveys the govern-
ment’s judgment that committed intimate re-
lationships between people of the same sex 
. . . are inferior to heterosexual relationships, 
and that the participants in a same-sex rela-
tionship are less deserving of society’s recog-
nition than heterosexual couples. . . . To the 
extent that laws differentiate majority and 
minority groups and accord them differing 
statuses, they highlight the perceived “dif-
ferentness” of the minority and thereby pro-
mote and perpetuate stigma.35 
DOMA communicates to the children of same-sex 
parents that their families, and the relationships 
within their families, are morally objectionable and 
functionally deficient. 
 This Court has previously considered state action 
that stigmatizes children relevant to assessing the 
constitutionality of such state action. Highlighting 
the adverse psychological effects of de jure segrega-
tion on black children, for example, a unanimous 
Court announced in Brown v. Board of Education:36 
To separate them from others of similar age 
and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
  
 
 35 Aff. of Gregory M. Herek, Ph.D. at ¶¶ 28, 30. 
 36 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ev-
er to be undone. . . . Segregation of white and 
colored children in public schools has a det-
rimental effect upon the colored children. 
The impact is greater when it has the sanc-
tion of the law, for the policy of separating 
the races is usually interpreted as denoting 
the inferiority of the negro group.37 
Children of same-sex parents, like the victims of 
racial segregation, suffer the harmful psychological 
effects of the condemnation of their families, which, 
as the Court noted in Brown, is compounded by the 
law’s sanction of this discrimination, and denotes the 
inferiority of their families. 
 Courts have acknowledged psychic harm to 
children as a constitutionally relevant consideration 
in other contexts. For example, in Plyler v. Doe,38 the 
Court examined the constitutionality of a Texas 
statute authorizing local school districts to deny 
enrollment to undocumented immigrant children. The 
Court described the effect of the law as levying an 
“inestimable toll . . . on the social, economic, intellec-
tual, and psychological wellbeing of the individual.”39 
The Court went on to emphasize the relevance of the 
law’s harmful impact on children to its constitutional-
ity, stating: 
 
 37 Id. at 494 (quoting the lower court). 
 38 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 39 Id. at 222 
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Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship 
on a discrete class of children not accounta-
ble for their disabling status. The stigma of 
illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their 
lives. . . . In determining the rationality of 
§ 21. 031, we may appropriately take into ac-
count its costs to the Nation and to the inno-
cent children who are its victims.40 
This Court need not find that discrimination against 
children of same-sex parents is identical to the dis-
crimination against black children in Brown or immi-
grant children in Plyler in every respect. What is 
clear from these cases, however, is that the stigma a 
discriminatory law imposes – particularly on children 
– is a worthy consideration when analyzing the 
constitutionality of that law. 
 By categorically refusing to recognize the legally 
sanctioned relationships of same-sex couples, DOMA 
deprives children in these families of important, 
family-supporting benefits that they would otherwise 
enjoy. Further, by declaring that the children of same-
sex couples are somehow less worthy than the chil-
dren of opposite-sex couples, DOMA stigmatizes all 
children with gay or lesbian parents.  
 DOMA treats families headed by same-sex cou-
ples as second-class families, and thereby relegates 
children in these families to second-class status 
relative to their peers. The assertion that DOMA is 
 
 40 Id. at 223-24 
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justified by a legitimate or important governmental 
interest in protecting children is thoroughly under-
mined by the reality that DOMA stigmatizes same-
sex families and inflicts psychological harm on the 
children of such families, while purporting to protect 
children generally.  
 
II. DOMA FAILS UNDER ANY LEVEL OF 
SCRUTINY BECAUSE IT PUNISHES 
CHILDREN BASED ON THE CONDUCT 
OF THEIR PARENTS 
 The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has 
expressed a consistent, special concern for discrimi-
nation against children.41 Why? Because discrimina-
tion against children always necessarily implicates 
two of the Equal Protection Clause’s core values: 
promoting a society in which one’s success or failure 
is the result of individual merit,42 and discouraging 
the creation of permanent class or caste distinctions.43 
 
 41 See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983) (noting explicit-
ly a “special concern” for illegitimate children); San Antonio Ind. 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the Court has a “special interest” in 
education because it is the “principal instrument in awakening 
the child” to cultural values, preparing children for professional 
training, and helping children adjust to the environment. 
(quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493)). 
 42 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222. See also Pollvogt at 926 
(identifying meritocracy as core equal protection value). 
 43 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
See also Pollvogt at 926 (discussing goal of Equal Protection 
Clause to eliminate laws that tend to create social castes). 
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Where laws function to place children in a distinct, 
disadvantaged class based on the conduct of their 
parents, these principles are violated.44 
 DOMA directly controverts these important 
prohibitions. Through its own proffered justifications 
for the law (that is, the notion that DOMA promotes 
child welfare), BLAG makes clear that DOMA not 
only expresses and enforces a preference for opposite-
sex couples over same-sex couples, but also expresses 
and enforces a preference for the children of opposite-
sex couples over the children of same-sex couples. 
Thus, BLAG’s justifications directly implicate this 
Court’s lengthy history of protecting children against 
such unfair (and inherently invidious) discrimination. 
 
A. The Court’s Treatment of Discrimina-
tion Against Non-Marital Children 
 This Court has consistently expressed special 
concern with discrimination against children – in 
particular protecting their right to self-determination 
and to flourish fully in society, without being ham-
pered by legal, economic and social barriers imposed 
by virtue of the circumstances of their birth.45 This 
 
 44 Plyler, 452 U.S. at 219-20. 
 45 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175 (stating that condemning a 
child for the actions of his parents is “illogical and unjust.”); 
Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (holding that it is invidious to discriminate 
against illegitimate children for the actions by people over which 
they have no control). 
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concern is perhaps most strongly expressed in the 
Court’s treatment of non-marital children.  
 The United States has a long history of discrimi-
nation against children born to unmarried parents.46 
Because of society’s moral condemnation of their 
parents’ conduct, they were denied legal and social 
benefits to which marital children were entitled. They 
could not inherit property; further, they were not 
entitled to financial parental support, wrongful death 
recovery, workers’ compensation, social security, and 
other government benefits.47 
 In the early 1940s, criticism of the treatment of 
non-marital children began to take root and became a 
part of the political and legal debates of the civil 
rights movement.48 In 1968, Professor Harry Krause 
and civil rights lawyer Norman Dorsen advanced 
child-centered arguments in Levy v. Louisiana, the 
 
 46 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447 (“rights [of a 
non-marital child] are very few, being only such as he can 
acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son 
of nobody.”); Gareth W. Cook, Bastards, 47 TEX. L. REV. 326, 327 
n.11 (1969). But see Levy, 391 U.S. at 70 (“We start from the 
premise that illegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’ They are 
humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly ‘persons’ 
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.). 
 47 See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma 
and Discrimination Against Non-marital Children, 63 FLA. L. 
REV. 345, 346-47 (2011).  
 48 Martha Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate 
Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 90 (2003) 
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first equal protection challenge on behalf of non-
marital children.49 
 Louise Levy, an unmarried African American 
mother with five young children, died from the medi-
cal malpractice of a state hospital.50 Thelma Levy, 
Louise’s sister, sued Louisiana on behalf of the Levy 
children, who were prohibited from a “right to recov-
er” because they were born outside of marriage.51 The 
Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the children’s claim on the grounds that 
they were not “legitimate,” insofar as “morals and 
general welfare . . . discourage[ ]  bringing children 
into the world out of wedlock.”52  
 In a groundbreaking legal victory for children, 
this Court reversed. The Court, citing Brown, ex-
plained its departure from its normal practice of 
deferring to legislative decisions: “we have been 
 
 49 Brief of Appellee, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) 
No. 508, 1968 WL 112826; see also, Smith, Equal Protection for 
Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2037519. 
 50 John C. Gray and David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowl-
edges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American 
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 
(1969). 
 51 Id. at 3. 
 52 Id. (quoting Levy v. Louisiana, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. 
Ct. App. 1967)). The Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari 
because it found the Court of Appeals made no error of law. Levy 
v. Louisiana, 250 La. 25 (1967). 
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extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights 
and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious 
classification even though it had history and tradition 
on its side.”53 The Court determined Louisiana’s 
actions were driven by invidious discrimination 
because the child’s status as “illegitimate” was unre-
lated to the injury to the mother.54  
 Four years after Levy, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co.,55 this Court struck another blow to 
government conduct that penalized children based on 
moral disdain for the parents’ conduct. Henry Clyde 
Stokes had died of work-related injuries. At the time 
of his death, he lived with Willie Mae Weber.56 Stokes 
and Weber were not married, but had five children.57 
One of the children was born to Stokes and Weber, 
while four others had been born to Stokes and his 
lawful wife, Adlay Jones, who had previously been 
committed to a mental hospital.58 Weber and Stokes’ 
second child was born shortly after Stokes’ death.59 
 The four marital children filed a workers’ com-
pensation claim for their father’s death, while Willie 
Mae Weber sought compensation benefits on behalf of 
 
 53 Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. 
 54 Id. at 72; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. 
 55 406 U.S. 164 (1972).  
 56 Id. at 165. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
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the non-marital children.60 Louisiana law awarded 
workers’ compensation proceeds to a deceased work-
er’s children born of his marriage, while the children 
born outside the marriage were denied those same 
proceeds.61 
 Once again, this Court reversed the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s decision, which had allowed laws to 
penalize non-marital children based on their parents’ 
conduct. The Court articulated a principle that is now 
well-established: treating children born outside of 
marriage differently than those born inside it is 
impermissible discrimination.62 The Court explained 
that marital and non-marital children were identical-
ly situated with respect to their interest in these 
benefits: “An unacknowledged illegitimate child may 
suffer as much from the loss of a parent as a child 
born within wedlock or an illegitimate later acknowl-
edged.”63 
 Weber, the most well-known and cited non-
marital status case, reiterated that a state may not 
express its moral objection of parental conduct by 
withholding government benefits from the child. To 
do so places the child at an economic disadvantage for 
conduct over which the child has no control. In Weber, 
the Court conceded that the state’s interest “in 
 
 60 Id. at 165-66. 
 61 Id. at 175-76. 
 62 Id. at 169. 
 63 Id. 
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protecting ‘legitimate family relationships’ ” was 
weighty.64 The Court acknowledged that “the regula-
tion and protection of the family unit have indeed 
been a venerable state concern.”65 Importantly, the 
Court did not “question the importance of that inter-
est” but did question “how the challenged statute will 
promote it.”66 The Court ultimately concluded that 
“[t]he state interest in family relationships is not 
served by the statute”67 explaining, “[t]he inferior 
classification of unacknowledged illegitimates bears, 
in this instance, no relationship to those recognized 
purposes of recovery which workmen’s compensation 
statutes commendably serve.”68  
 In other words, while promoting marriage and 
childbirth within marriage may be a valid state 
interest in the abstract, the Court rejected the con-
tention that this interest is advanced by excluding a 
group of children who have an identical interest in 
the benefits at issue, simply because that group of 
children is disfavored.  
 Similarly, although it is unusual for the federal 
government to be in the business of regulating mar-
riage at all, BLAG’s purported concern for promoting 
  
 
 64 Id. at 173. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 175. 
 68 Id. 
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childbirth in marriage may appear to be a superficial-
ly legitimate governmental interest. But it is unclear 
how excluding families headed by married same-sex 
couples advances this interest. Protecting the family 
unit is one matter; expressing a bare preference for 
one type of family is another. 
 In light of this history and legal precedent,69 it is 
apparent that BLAG’s argument that DOMA some-
how protects children suffers from the same, fatally 
flawed reasoning that had been used to justify dis-
crimination against non-marital children. BLAG 
seeks to permanently exclude an entire class of 
children from access to family-supporting federal 
benefits because it finds their parents’ conduct to be 
objectionable. This is not a sufficient basis for such 
profound discrimination. 
 The rationales articulated in Levy and Weber 
formed early equal protection jurisprudence and 
spoke to the importance of the social and economic 
rights unique to children.70 That the history of dis-
crimination at issue in Levy and Weber turned on the 
 
 69 Between 1968 to 1986, this Court heard more than a 
dozen cases challenging laws that disadvantaged non-marital 
children, ultimately holding that this classification was of such 
concern that differential treatment of non-marital children 
warranted intermediate scrutiny. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 
456, 465 (1988). 
 70 See Laurence C. Nolan, “Unwed Children” and Their 
Parents Before the United States Supreme Court from Levy to 
Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1999). 
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distinction between marital and non–marital children 
(as compared to the distinction drawn by DOMA 
between children of same-sex married parents and 
children of opposite-sex married parents) does not 
insulate BLAG’s justifications from a determination 
that DOMA violates the values that animate the 
Equal Protection Clause. The fact that DOMA pur-
ports to promote “legitimate family relationships” by 
preferring some children over others is an insufficient 
justification for the discrimination it enacts and the 
harms it inflicts.  
 
B. The Court’s Broader Concern with 
Discrimination Against Children 
 The Court has additionally expressed special 
concern about unfair discrimination against children 
in other contexts. Specifically, Weber’s moral and 
jurisprudential clarity about discrimination against 
children was echoed years later in Plyler v. Doe.71 At 
issue in Plyler was a state law that sought to deny 
public education to the children of undocumented 
immigrants. In deciding the case, the Court relied 
heavily on the factual findings of the district court 
to the effect that (1) the law did nothing to improve 
the quality of education in the state and (2) it in-
stead tended to “permanently lock[] the children of 
 
 71 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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undocumented immigrants into the lowest socio-
economic class.”72 
 The Court highlighted the foundational mission 
of the Equal Protection Clause: “to work nothing less 
than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious 
class-based legislation.”73 To be sure, not all laws that 
distinguish between groups fall under this prohibi-
tion. But laws that determine the legal, economic and 
social status of children, based on the circumstances 
of their birth, surely do. As the Court explained in 
Plyler, “[l]egislation imposing special disabilities upon 
groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond 
their control suggests the kind of ‘class or caste’ 
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed to abolish.”74  
 The Court went on to emphasize that, even 
though it was arguably permissible to disapprove of 
the presence of undocumented immigrants in the 
United States, this concern did not justify “imposing 
disabilities on the minor children of illegal immi-
grants.”75 In support of its holding, the Court an-
nounced, “Even if the state found it expedient to 
control the conduct of adults by acting against their 
children, legislation directing the onus of a parent’s 
misconduct against his children does not comport 
 
 72 Id. at 208. 
 73 Id. at 213. 
 74 Id. at 216 n.14 (emphasis added). 
 75 Id. at 219-20.  
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with fundamental conceptions of justice.”76 Thus, 
discrimination against children is unjust in part 
because it contravenes “one of the goals of the Equal 
Protection Clause . . . [which is] the abolition of 
governmental barriers to advancement on the basis of 
individual merit.”77  
 The Equal Protection Clause mandates that 
those who are similarly situated be treated alike.78 
The Plyler Court implemented this mandate by 
determining whether the children of undocumented 
immigrants were different in a way that was relevant 
to children’s interest in receiving an education. Simi-
larly, the relevant inquiry with respect to DOMA is 
whether the children of married same-sex couples are 
different in a way that is relevant to their interest in 
benefitting from the myriad family-supporting pro-
grams the government provides to promote stability 
and opportunity in our society. The answer is une-
quivocally “no.” 
 
C. Moral Disapproval of the Parents’ Re-
lationship is Not a Permissible Basis 
for Punishing Children 
 Finally, the Court has gone so far as to categori-
cally reject moral disapproval of parental conduct and 
choices, even when enforcing such disapproval may, 
 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. at 222. 
 78 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202). 
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at the time, be viewed by government decision mak-
ers as serving the best interests of the child. In 
Palmore v. Sidoti,79 the Court took the unusual step of 
reviewing a state family court’s custody award. 
Following the divorce, the mother in the case was 
awarded custody of the couple’s infant child. Both the 
father and the mother were white. Subsequent to the 
divorce, the mother entered into a relationship with 
and married a black man. The father sought custody 
of the child based on these “changed circumstances.”  
 The family court explicitly found that there was 
no concern about either the mother’s or the stepfa-
ther’s parental fitness. Nonetheless, the court took to 
heart the recommendation of a counselor, who ex-
pressed concern about the “social consequences” for a 
child being raised in “an interracial marriage.” Specif-
ically, the counselor opined: 
“The wife [petitioner] has chosen for herself 
and for her a child, a life-style unacceptable 
to the father and to society . . . The child is, 
or at school age will be, subject to environ-
mental pressures not of choice.”80 
On this basis, “the [family] court concluded that the 
best interest of the child would be served by awarding 
custody to the father.”81 While acknowledging that the 
father’s disapproval of the relationship was not a 
 
 79 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 80 Id. at 431.  
 81 Id. 
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sufficient basis for awarding him custody, the family 
court determined that because society did not yet 
fully accept interracial relationships, the child would 
inevitably “suffer from . . . social stigmatization.”82 On 
this basis, the family court awarded custody to the 
father. 
 This Court applied strict scrutiny to the family 
court’s decision, and concluded that the stated inter-
est in serving the best interests of the child was “a 
duty of the highest order.”83 However, the Court’s chief 
concern was in regard to the actual function of the 
ruling, which was to give legal effect to private bias.84 
The Court held that the family court’s decision, which 
determined the rights of the child based on societal 
disapproval of the parents, violated equal protection, 
famously stating: “Private biases may be outside the 
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or 
indirectly, give them effect.”85 
 Here, DOMA denies children benefits by giving 
effect to private bias in two different ways. First, as 
detailed above, it gives effect to private bias against 
same-sex couples. Second, as discussed below, it gives 
effect to private bias regarding impermissible gender-
role stereotypes in parenting. 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 433. 
 84 See id. at 433. 
 85 Id. 
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 BLAG baldly asserts that one of the justifications 
for DOMA is that DOMA serves to promote “chil-
drearing by both a mother and a father,”86 which it 
considers an optimal parenting situation. BLAG 
grounds the claim that opposite-sex parenting is 
superior in “common sense” and “the experience of 
countless parents.”87 This, according to BLAG, repre-
sents a legitimate state interest, because “it is 
rational for the federal government to encourage 
childrearing in situations in which children have a 
mother and a father,” because there are “biological 
differentiation[s] in the roles of mothers and fathers” 
and “typical differences between men and women in 
parenting style, size and voice tone.”88 
 The insistence that “opposite-sex parenting” 
necessarily leads to differentiation in parental roles is 
inescapably grounded in impermissible gender-role 
stereotyping. “The gender-based assumptions that 
women and men bring inherent differences to child-
rearing and parental responsibilities – differences 
which render same-sex couples incapable of success-
ful child-rearing by comparison – rest on gender 
stereotyping, as scholars have explained.”89  
 
 86 Brief for Respondent at 48. 
 87 Brief for Respondent at 50. 
 88 See Brief for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant at 56, 
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Nos. 12-15388, 12-15409 
(9th Cir. June 4, 2012), 2012 WL 2132484. 
 89 Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Gay 
and Lesbian Parents: Challenging the Three Pillars of Exclusion 
(Continued on following page) 
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 It is well established that laws may not rely on 
overbroad generalizations about different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females.90 
Assumptions about expected parenting roles that 
men and women must or should perform based on 
gender alone falls squarely within the gender stereo-
typing that has been deemed impermissible in equal 
protection law, including in decisions about parents 
and parenting. 
 For example, in Caban v. Mohammed,91 the Court 
struck down a New York law that permitted unwed 
mothers to block the adoption of their children by 
 
– Legitimacy, Dual-Gender Parenting, 28 LAW & INEQ. 307, 326 
(2010). See also Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: 
Children and Bans on Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Mar-
riages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2768 (“The normative notion[] 
that optimal child care depends on something unique about 
mothers as women conflates social expectations and roles 
imposed on parents according to their sex/gender with seemingly 
natural and intrinsic characteristics that distinguish women 
from men (and vice versa).”); Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay 
Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of Differ-
ence, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 725-48 (2003); Nan D. Hunter, The 
Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & 
POL’Y 397, 413 (2000). 
 90 See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533; see also Nevada 
Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003) 
(recognizing “pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family 
members is women’s work” an insufficient justification under 
Equal Protection Clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 
(1979) (holding invalid justification based on state’s preference 
for allocation of family responsibilities under which wife plays a 
dependent role).  
 91 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
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denying consent to potential adoptees. The law did 
not, however, extend this consent-based objection to 
unwed fathers. The father in the case challenged the 
gender-based distinction as an equal protection 
violation after his parental rights were terminated. 
The mother argued that the distinction between 
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers was based 
on a fundamental difference between the sexes, 
because “a natural mother, absent special circum-
stances, bears a closer relationship with her child” 
than a father.92 This Court disagreed, finding that 
“maternal and paternal roles are not invariably 
different in importance,” and, even if unwed mothers 
were closer to their newborn children, “this generali-
zation concerning parent-child relations would be-
come less acceptable . . . as the age of the child 
increased.”93 The court “reject[ed] . . . the claim that 
the broad gender-based distinction of [the statute] is 
required by any universal difference between mater-
nal and paternal relations at every phase of a child’s 
development.”94 
 As the state did in Caban, BLAG here relies 
on impermissible, overbroad generalizations about 
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males 
and females.95 This not only fails to provide a rational 
 
 92 Id. at 387-89. 
 93 Id. at 389. 
 94 Id.  
 95 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 
268, 279-80 (1979) (holding invalid justification based on state’s 
(Continued on following page) 
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basis for a law; it embodies a form of categorically 
impermissible discrimination. 
 In conclusion, the parallels between the states’ 
arguments in support of discriminatory legislation in 
Levy, Weber, Plyler, Palmore, and Caban and BLAG’s 
argument in support of DOMA are impossible to 
ignore. The reasoning and holdings in these cases 
instruct that it is impermissible for laws to disad-
vantage children for matters outside of their control, 
in an effort to control the conduct of their parents, or 
as an expression of moral disapproval of their par-
ents’ relationships and conduct. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The child-welfare justifications advanced by 
BLAG in support of DOMA embody the very essence 
of invidious discrimination: BLAG contends, in es-
sence, that families headed by married, opposite-sex 
couples are benefitted because families headed by 
married, same-sex couples are excluded from im-
portant rights and benefits – rights and benefits that 
serve the general social good of promoting family 
stability. Multiple courts have found that DOMA does 
 
preference for allocation of family responsibilities under which 
wife plays a dependent role); and Nevada Dept. of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003) (recognizing 
“pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is 
women’s work” an insufficient justification under Equal Protec-
tion Clause). 
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nothing to advance the interests that BLAG invokes 
to justify the law. But it is beyond argument that 
DOMA serves to harm – both concretely and symboli-
cally – the families it excludes, including the children 
in those families. 
 As this Court has thoughtfully observed,  
[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve 
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its 
principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.96 
Although BLAG may morally disapprove of same-sex 
marriage, DOMA’s harmful impact on generations of 
children of same-sex couples renders it ineffective, 
unjust, and patently impermissible. 
  
 
 96 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. 
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 The judgment of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals should be affirmed. 
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